

Technology and Methods for Information Privacy

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


Contents

- Information Privacy
 - Concept
 - Legal background
 - User perspective
- Privacy enhancing techology (PET)
 - History
 - Relevance
 - Examples
- Identity management & privacy



Privacy Protection in IT






Legal view: Fundamental Principles

- Principles concerning the fundamental design of products and applications:
 - Data minimization, Transparency of processing, Security
- Principles concerning the lawfulness of processing:
 - Legality, Special categories of personal data,
 - Finality and purpose limitation, Data quality
- Rights of the data subject:
 - Information requirements, Access, correction, erasure, blocking,
 Objection to processing
- Data traffic with third countries
- Notification requirements
- Processing by a processor responsibility and control
- ➤ Other specific requirements resulting from the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC/, Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and the national legislation.



Solove's privacy threat taxonomy






User perspective

- Users of on-line information systems feel invreasingly exposed to other parties' information processing
- Users express in surveys both:
 - Transparency on processing and data stored
 - Control and participation on dissemination and treatment of personal information
- Users do have a limited budget for active management of these issues
- ► There is a clear benefit in offering tool-based transparency and control concerning personal information processing



A brief history of PET



- ► PET development inspired by the legal perspective on basic human rights.
- ► PET research focused on information hiding & control
- **►** Technology-centric approach

But there is a lack of deployed PETs in the "real world". Why?



Privacy Relevance Reputation

Branding loss

Customer loss

Competitive loss

Business loss



Privacy Relevance Reputation

Legal Compliance

Fines

Exclusion from tender

Legal processing

Branding loss

Customer loss

Competitive loss


Business loss








Duality of Privacy Risks



Fritsch, Lothar; Abie, Habtamu: A Road Map to Privacy Management, Oslo, Norway, 2007



Technology view: PETs



Anonymizer.com™









MixMaster: Anonymous E-Mail



- Cloud of dedicated mail-forwarders
- Cyrptographic protocol with multiple layers of encryption
- Mail-forwarding in mixed batches
- MIX-principle (D. Chaum)



Unobservable Webbrowsing





- MIX principle implemented for websurfing and webbased applications
- ANON and TOR networks operative with crypto protocols and extensive router networks
- User-friendly browser "XeroBank" based on Firefox



Browser cookie manipulation

- Swaps and manages cookies
- Random cookie exchange with other users



- Goal:
 - control sending and storage of own broser cookies
 - Attack server profiling databases by sending fake cookies or other people's cookies
- Configurable rulesets



Anonymous credential systems

- IDEMIX system invented by IBM research lab
 - provides zero-knowledge proofs and other cryptographic mechanisms that can assert ID information without showing it
 - Part of Eclipse/Higgings environment

- Microsoft UPROVEIT build into Vista
 - Available funcitonality for anonymous credentials and secure, ID-protected remote attestation



Identity Management & Privacy

- Choice of an IDM scheme has implications for privacy
- Sudden change in IDM or application strategy can cause side effects for privacy and security (e.g. ID theft)
- IDM scheme should be part of risk analysis and privacy impact analysis cycles




Risks created by IDM systems

Risk Contributing Factors	Parameters
Token Mobility	copyable, remotely usable,
	concurrently usable, immobile
Token Value at Risk	$loss,\ misuse,\ disclosure,\ disruption,$
	theft, replacement value
Token Provisioning	creation, editing, deletion
Token Frequency &	Uses per year, life-time,
Duration of Use	$multiple\ times,\ one ext{-}time$
Token Use & Purpose	original, unintended
Token Assignment & Relationship	$forced,\ chosen,\ jointly\text{-}established,$
	$role,\ pseudonymity$
Token Obligation & Policy	$absence,\ present,\ functionality$
Token Claim Type	$single,\ multiple$
Token Secrecy	public, inferable, secret
Token Security	$origination,\ identification,\ validation,$
	$authentication,\ authorization$

Fritsch, Paintsil, IFIP Summer School 2010, results from the PETweb II project



Business view: Return On Privacy Investment ROPI



Fritsch, Lothar und Abie, Habtamu. (2008) A Road Map to the Management of Privacy Risks in Information Systems, in: Gesellschaft f. Informatik (GI) (Eds.): *Konferenzband Sicherheit 2008, Lecture Notes in Informatics LNI 128*, 2-Apr-2007, Bonn, Gesellschaft für Informatik, pp. 1-15.



Privacy Investment Decision Instruments

System
Environment
Analysis
Instrument

Legal frame Technical frame User requirements Business Models Privacy Impact Analysis Instrument

Threats to privacy
Threat impact model
Impact analysis

Countermeasures Instrument

Catalog of protection PET catalog

Insurance coverage

Hope & Pray

Total Cost of Ownership Instrument

Model of cost, Effectiveness and efficiency of privacy protection

Abstraction of PET into function, price and QoS

Design & Deployment Instrument

Business process model

Life cycle

Best practices

Assurance

What is the system about?

Where are the problems?

What can be done?

What can we afford?

How will it be put in place?



Identity Management & ID theft

- identifiers can tell many stories.
- The most simple approach is a person number indexed in a data base. BUT: Who owns the data base, and how will it be protected from unauthorized use?
- IDM systems move some of the data to a token. But then, the token is out of the security perimeter of the vendor.
- The use of anonymizing schemes, cryptographic methods, randomized numbering schemes and zeroknowledge-protocols for identifier handling should be considered.
- Identifiers should be analyzed for information leakage and possible risks.



Access Control & Information Flow

- Multi-level and role-based access control models are used in server & mainframe computing for more than three decades.
- Security models implemented on a "need to know" basis.
- But today's e-ID approaches aim for maximum transparency, efficient identification, and global standardization.
- Information flow analysis and access control models are essential to protect e-IDs.



- Are you aware of all contextual information that can be correlated to your e-IDs?
 - Use frequency & destinations
 - Person names & other personal data
 - predictable identifiers (e.g. serial number sequences)
- Countermeasures:
 - Identifier management
 - Encryption from token to application level
 - Use tags without individual numbers/names
 - One-time identifiers and anonymous credentials



- Do your tokens contain interpretable information?
 - product keys
 - customer information
 - indications of object value
 - origin information
- Countermeasures:
 - Identifier management & pseudonyms
 - Encryption & Access control
 - Short lifetime of e-ID tokens



- Are your identifiers person-relateable?
 - Equipment check-out
 - e-tickets
 - consumer items
 - ID cards, door cards, passports, bank cards
- Countermeasures
 - De-activation (including RFID chip serial number!)
 - Identity management
 - Privacy risk assessment & audits
 - Privacy-enhancing technology (PET)



► Are your e-IDs securely bound to the legitimate user or person?

- Countermeasures
 - Multi-factor authentication
 - "Biometrics" derived from the person (extra privacy challenges!)



Summary

- Privacy management is part of IT management
- Privacy-enhancing technology is available & should be part of IT plan
- Identity management should be part of the privacy concepts
- Some of the business implications are not well researched



IFIP IDMAN 2010

- International conference of IFIP TC 11.6
- Topic: Identity Management and Society
- Many international speakers
- Keynotes on e-voting security and identity management
- ► 18.-19. 11. 2010 in Oslo, Norway
- Program & registration under http://ifipidman2010.nr.no



What can Norsk Regnesentral provide?

- Scientific research & consulting in security concepts
- Evaluation of security systems, properties & privacy impact
- Preparation of IT certification or audit

- Industry- or publicly funded research
- Open or confidential cooperation



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